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unfrozen water, followed the same laws,
actual freezing causing only a slightly
greater reduction than a temperature just
above the freezing point. Finally, a few
e2xperiments on the formation of ice on a
free surface showed that 90 per cent. of the
germs present were excluded from the ice
by physical processes. The authors conclude
that the danger of typhoid infection from
the small fraction of weakened germs re-
maining in natural ice is probably not a
serious one, and that the results of their
experiments are in harmony with the facts
of experience. H. W. CON,
Secretary.
SCIENTIFIC BOOKS.
Psychology and Life. By HUGO MPNSTERBERG.
Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Pp. xi+ 286.
Professor Miinsterberg has here gathered to-
gether a number of essays, and has given to the
collection the title of the first of the papers. The
others are discussions of the relation of Psy-
chology to Physiology, Education, Art, History
and ' Psychical Research,' respectively. The
chapters thus have a common starting point in
Psychology from which they veer off in differ-
ent directions. The author's special comments
in these many fields it is impossible to repro-
duce here even in outline; we must confine
ourselves to the more general doctrine pre-
sented in the work.
The book is in many ways an exposition, or
at least the hint, of a philosophy; and to deal
with it adequately would take one inevitably
into deep water. With his main contention that
Psychology is but a partial way of dealing with
the mind, the present writer feels entire sym-
pathy. It is important to have it put strongly
by a psychologist that when we shall have cat-
alogued all the facts of our mental life and have
discovered their causal order-which is the pur-
pose of psychology-there still remain the larger
questions which have to do with the value and
meaning of these occurrences. Psychology, like
any natural science, is concerned merely with
the facts; its aim is to describe and explain
things; and to this end leaves out of account
the all-important problem of what our con-
sciousness signifies or what its ideals should be.
The things we perceive, he is fond of saying,
merely ' exist ' but are not ' real '. For this
reason the real mental life-the life of will, of
action, of valuation, of ideals-lies outside the
province of psychology, which is ever busy with
the beggarly elements of the mental life and
never takes up the problems that interest us as
active and moral beings-questions of deeper
truth, of beauty, of conscience and religion.
The scientific spirit is consequently something
which stands in contrast with real life; it is no
substitute for the moral and religious spirit.
At the same time Professor Miinsterberg
somewhat clouds this correct perception of his
by putting the antithesis between facts and
values too strongly. At times it looks almost
as if each could get along without the other; as
if a great gulf were fixed between them, so that
the realm of ideas appears in almost Platonic
isolation from the world of sense-perception.
The ' world of values' and the ' world of facts '
are of course not two worlds, but rather differ-
ent ways of considering the self-same world. In
Kantian phrase, we might say that facts with-
out values are blind, while values without facts
are empty. Professor Miinsterberg shows, at
least in one passage, that he himself takes this
view; but a certain love of contrast and antith-
esis, too often makes him put the matter other-
wise.
And in his endeavor to show the insufficiency
of the psychological standpoint, the author
really does injustice to psychology. He holds
that psychology does, and must ' transform ' the
facts for purposes of explanation; and expla-
nation, he believes, is possible only when we
can restate the facts in terms of atoms or some-
thing else equally elementary. In psychology,
consequently, everything must, by hook or
crook, be analyzed into sensations, since these
are the mental elements which correspond to
the atoms of the physical world. Even when
we distinctly know that the real mental process
-an idea, an emotion, or act of will-is not
completely described when we have enumerated
the sensations that compose it, nevertheless
(according to the author) the psychologist is by
the logic of the situation forced to shut his eyes
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to anything but these sensations and their laws.
He must at least make believe that the act of
will, for instance, is composed merely of sensa-
tions chiefly from the muscles, because only
thereby is ' explanation ' possible. In psychol-
ogy, consequently, the truth is inevitably con-
cealed, and some complex of sensations is sub-
stituted for the real mental process which we
are to explain.
Few psychologists, I feel sure, would admit
that this is a correct account of the psycholog-
ical method. It sounds almost like a veiled
apologia for some of the theories of both Profes-
sor Miinsterberg and Professor James. They
have each in their own way attempted to con-
vince the world that certain ' complexes of sen-
sations ' were the whole truth in an act of will
or an emotion; and the world has in the main
steadily refused to be convinced. But now we
are, as it were, called into the private office,
and are told: " Of course, gentlemen, the com-
plexes of sensations really are not the will or
the emotion, but that is what we have to say
they are if we are to be faithful to psychology."
But if in actually experiencing volition or
emotion we clearly see that it is not a mere group
of sensations, why should we be called upon
gravely to declare in our psychologies the oppo-
site? There is nothing in the rules of psychol-
ogy to prevent our saying all the while that we
are talking about the sensations characteristic of
will or of emotion or of judgment-a mere part
of the full process in consciousness. And if we
can see, for instance, that a judgment has
features additional to the mere sensations of
muscular flexion or extension, I see no reasoln
why, as psychologists, we should say, resign-
edly, that these other features are indescribable
and beyond the pale of science. Quite apart
from the question of values or of ideals, the
experience itself reveals peculiarities of form
that are quite definite and intelligible and com-
municable-has subject and predicate and the
affirmative or negative connection, all of which
are absent when the same sensations appear in
a merely associative or temporal conniection.
Professor Miinsterberg gives no sufficient reason
why psychologists should hold that sensations
are the only things in a mental process that are
definite and describable and capable of helping
to explain the process. As well might the
physicist say that in his realm the bare atoms
are all that he can take account of; when, in
fact, time and distance are most necessary for
any explanation that really explains. In other
words, physical science has to take account
both of the ' elements ' and of their relation-
ship or ' form.' And psychologists must do the
same, noting not only such relations as are
common to psychology and the physical sci-
ences (time, for instance), but searching dili-
gently whether there may not be some that are
peculiar to our private mental life.
The general trend of the book, as can be
readily seen, is to propose a more moderate
estimate of psychology in general and of the
laboratory work particularly. The later meth-
ods all come in for a drubbing: there is no
quantitative work possible by psychological ex-
periments; the brain physiologists can only
borrow from psychology but give nothing in
return; and child-study, with honorable excep-
tions, is something of a humbug. So that the
general tone is a trifle disheartening to any of
us who have faith in psychology and wish it
well. As a counter-blast to those writings
that magnify the office of psychology it may
serve a good purpose. And since it is largely
addressed to teachers, its chief benefit will un-
doubtedly be to remind them that a correct
appreciation of the child and of the aims and
ideals which are to be aroused in him is quite
as important as a knowledge of the mechanism
of the child's mind.
GEORGE M. STRATTON.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
The Races of Man. An Outline of Anthropol-
ogy and Ethnography. By J. DENIKER, Sc. D.
(Paris)-London. 1900. Walter Scott (Amer-
ican publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons). 611
pp., 176 illus., 2 maps.
The author of this handy text-book, forming
Volume 37 in the Contemporary Science Series,
is librarian of the Musee d'Histoire Naturelle
in Paris. Moreover, he is a ripe specialist in
human biology. Having, then, his own past
experience as a guide, and being in touch with
all the literature upon his theme, one is not
surprised to find him interesting and instructive
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